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Abstract
Clean-up actions in inhabited areas cannot be undertaken without dialogue 
and consensus between the stakeholders and inhabitants in the contaminated 
area. In this report, possible clean-up strategies are studied in a hypothetical 
radiation accident at a nuclear power plant. The effectiveness to reduce the dose, 
the monetary costs of actions, workers risks and actions feasibility were assessed. 
The clean-up strategies were analysed in a facilitated workshop which was 
attended by all key players in order to find out the most appropriate strategies 
to protect the public, the workers and the environment.
The participants rated the workshop method very valuable. The most 
adequate clean-up strategy was found and agreed upon; during the workshop the 
participants were even able to improve the outcome by modifying the strategy 
options prepared in advance. The positive feedback and high commitment to 
the work could be a result from the transparent process and the fact that 
many participants were local inhabitants in the most ‘contaminated’ area. This 
emphasized the importance of local public participation in the environmental 
decision-making process.
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Ydinonnettomuuden jälkeen asuinalueilla tehtävien puhdistustoimenpiteiden 
analysointi päätösriihimenetelmällä. STUK-A214. Helsinki 2005, 54 s.
Avainsanat: ydinonnettomuustilanteiden hallinta, puhdistustoimenpiteet, 
päätöksenteon tuki, moniattribuuttiriskianalyysi, sidosryhmien osallistu-
minen
Tiivistelmä 
Ydin- tai säteilyonnettomuuden jälkeen asuinalueilla tehtäviä puhdistustoimen-
piteitä ei voi tehdä ilman sidosryhmien ja paikallisen väestön välistä dialogia ja 
yhteisymmärrystä. Tässä raportissa on tutkittu oletetun ydinvoimalaitosonnet-
tomuuden jälkeen tehtäviä puhdistustoimenpidestrategioita. Työssä on arvioitu 
mahdollisten toimenpiteiden tehokkuus vähentää annosta, työntekijöiden riskit, 
toimenpiteiden kustannukset ja toteuttamiskelpoisuus. Toimenpidestrategiat 
analysoitiin päätösriihessä, johon osallistuivat kaikki avainhenkilöt. Tavoitteena 
oli löytää ne strategiat, jotka parhaiten suojelevat väestöä, työntekijöitä ja 
ympäristöä. 
Riiheen osallistujat arvottivat päätösriihimenetelmän hyvin hyödylliseksi. 
Tunnistettiin ja sovittiin parhaimmasta strategiasta; riihen aikana osallistujat 
jopa modifioivat etukäteen valmisteltuja toimenpidevaihtoehtoja ja löysivät 
paremman strategian. Saatu positiivinen palaute riihestä ja sitoutuminen työs-
kentelyyn seurannevat avoimesta päätöksentekoprosessista ja varsinkin siitä, 
että monet osallistujat olivat oletetun pahimmin saastuneen alueen asukkaita. 
On tärkeää, että paikallinen väestö voi osallistua ympäristöään koskevaan 
päätöksentekoon.
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1 Introduction
As a consequence of a major nuclear accident, thousands of square kilometres 
may be unevenly contaminated by a radioactive fallout, and various protective 
actions might be needed to reduce the dose to the public from the deposited 
radionuclides. In inhabited areas, a broad range of surfaces is contaminated by 
the radioactive fallout: exteriors and interiors of buildings, streets, trees, bushes 
and lawns in parks and gardens. The contamination level varies depending on 
the release composition, prevailing weather at the time of the fallout, and on the 
surface. Precipitation causes generally higher total deposition. Dry deposition 
contaminates predominately roofs, streets, leaves of trees, bushes and lawns. 
Rain washes these surfaces and contaminants accumulate on the ground and in 
the sewage system. In addition to deliberate decontamination, regular cleaning 
and natural processes, such as precipitation, transport of contaminants from 
building surfaces to the topsoil, and from the topsoil into the deeper layers. Such 
processes together with the radioactive decay will reduce the dose-rate in the 
course of time.
From the radiation protection point of view the aim of protective actions 
is to reduce the individual as well as the collective dose to the public and at the 
same time to prevent any unnecessary increase in the dose of workers carrying 
out the recovery operations. It is also desired to reduce radiological impacts on the 
environment, to bring the contamination under control, and to keep the area in 
or return it back into unrestricted use by feasible decontamination measures.
A comprehensive overview of the major methods to clean-up large areas is 
available in the literature (Andersson 1996, Andersson and Roed 1999, Andersson 
et al. 1995 and 2003, Brown et al. 1996, IAEA 1989, Lehto 1994). The successful 
implementation of the actions, however, requires adequate knowledge of the 
situation and good planning including the identification of those issues that the 
stakeholders and the population of the contaminated areas wish to consider 
when choosing and implementing the actions. The international organisations 
in radiation protection have also emphasized that the basis for the decision 
must be perceived by the public, and all relevant factors concerning the decision 
should be considered in a rational manner, i.e. the actions should be justified and 
optimised (ICRP 2000). The facilitated workshop method employs a group process 
where responsibility is placed on participants to assimilate the information and 
to provide judgements. Decision analytical methods applied in the workshops are 
used to identify the objectives, criteria or performance measures and to assess 
their relative importance to the decision. The aim is to create better alternatives 
for decisions and get a structured overall view of the problem. Consequently, the 
decisions to be made will be transparent and justifiable.
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Decision analysis techniques have been applied to improve the understanding 
of social and environmental decisions in problems dealing with such issues as 
wastewater treatment and wilderness preservation (McDaniels 1996; McDaniels 
and Roessler 1998). Gregory and Keeney (1994) organised a workshop to elicit 
the stakeholders’ values and used these as a basis for creating an improved set 
of alternatives whether to permit the development of a coal mine in an isolated 
pristine tropical rain forest. Marttunen and Hämäläinen (1995) applied decision 
analysis during computer supported interviews and involved a large number of 
stakeholders in two river development projects. The papers by Apostolakis and 
Pickett (1998), Hämäläinen (1988, 1990, 1992), Hämäläinen and Karjalainen 
(1992), Keeney and von Winterfelt (1993) and Keeney (1980) are examples of 
studies that deal with the clean-up of a hazardous waste site, energy policy of 
nuclear power and management of nuclear waste. Facilitated workshops have 
earlier been successfully applied, e.g. after the Chernobyl accident and in the 
planning of protective actions in hypothetical radiation accidents, to find out 
appropriate interventions (Albrecht et al. 1997; Aumonier and French 1992; 
Bartzis et al. 1999; French et al. 1996; Hämäläinen et al 2000; International 
Chernobyl Project 1991; Sinkko et al. 2004; Zeevaert et al. 2001).
The Finnish workshop dealing with clean-up actions in inhabited areas 
reported here was a part of the EVATECH research project “Information 
Requirements and Countermeasure Evaluation Techniques in Nuclear Emergency 
Management” under the key action “Nuclear Fission” of the fifth Euratom 
Framework Programme (FP5) of the European Commission. The main objectives 
of EVATECH’s national workshops were: (1) to develop methods for stakeholder 
involvement in exercises and emergency planning; (2) to verify the factors driving 
the decision making; (3) to explore the information needs of all the parties 
involved in decision making and (4) to identify those forms of strategy that the 
relevant organisations wish to consider.
The report is structured in the following way. Chapter 2 describes the 
events that were assumed to happen during an acute accident phase and the 
protective actions taken. We only consider those actions that are of relevance 
for clean-up actions in inhabited areas one week after the accident. Applicable 
clean-up actions are described in Chapter 3. In addition, tentative strategies 
for the workshop are suggested for constituting portfolios of different clean-up 
actions in areas with similar contamination. The tangible attributes, such as doses 
and monetary costs, are also assessed. Chapter 4 deals with the workshop, its 
arrangement, the elicitation of attributes, the decision analysis of the problem and 
discussion of the results. In addition, the participants’ evaluation of the workshop 
is given in this chapter. Chapter 5 contains a discussion of the observations.
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2 Day of the hypothetical accident
2.1 Accident scenario
The national workshops arranged within the EVATECH project were based on 
a hypothetical accident in a typical European PWR (Pressurized Water Reactor) 
with a large, dry steel containment and about 2000 MW(th) of power. The release 
scenario was taken from a typical containment failure classification for that type 
of nuclear power plant (NPP). For the purpose of the Finnish workshop it was 
assumed that a hypothetical core-damaging and containment leak accident had 
occurred at the Loviisa NPP, and this led to the contamination of the eastern 
part of the Uusimaa province. The assumed time of the accident was in the 
beginning of June, on a working day. The estimated probability of occurrence of 
such a containment failure accident leading to a significant release is less than 
one in 1,000,000 per reactor-year for this NPP. The progress of the accident was 
described as follows (Niemelä 2002):
‘The accident starts with a fire in one of the electrical cabinet rooms causing 
a successful shutdown of the reactor. An independent failure of the emergency core 
cooling system and the effects of the fire prevent core cooling. The containment 
is successfully isolated. Core heat-up starts 3.5 hours after shutdown and one 
hour later the vessel breaches at high pressure. Containment sprays start and 
operate successfully. The debris in the cavity cannot be cooled, however, and its 
temperature reaches 2500K seven hours after shutdown. Five hours later the 
temperature is stabilized at 1600K. Large quantities of hydrogen and carbon 
monoxide were generated. Combustion occurs 43 hours after shutdown and 
causes the containment to fail. As a consequence, radionuclides escape to the 
environment.’
The release began 43 hours after the shutdown, at 08:00, and lasted for 
12 hours. The release rate decreased roughly exponentially within 12 hours. 
The venting occurred at a height of 60 m, but the released plume rose to 100 
m (effective release height) due to thermal buoyancy. It was assumed that the 
initial sensible heat release rate was in the order of a few megawatts.
The following weather situation was selected from the historical numerical 
weather prediction data. The accident day was a rainless day over Finland with 
weak winds (4 – 9 m / s) from south and southwest. The wind turned during the 
second night and started to blow from south and southeast. There were sporadic 
rain showers during the night and in the morning hours on the next day when 
the radioactive material was released. Thereafter the weather was dry again. 
Based on the measurements it was concluded that the fallout could be described 
by the release fractions given in Table I (p. 10).
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Figure 1. To protect the population evacuation, iodine prophylaxis and sheltering 
were recommended and implemented before the release had reached the marked 
municipalities.
Table I. Release used in consequence calculations. 
Nuclide group Release fraction
Noble gases 8 · 10-1 
Iodine total 1.1 · 10-2
Alkaline-group (Cs, Rb) 1 · 10-2
Tellurium-group (Te, Se, Sb) 1 · 10-6
Alkaline earth-group (Sr, Ba) < 1 · 10-10
Ruthenium-group (Ru, Mo, Tc) < 1 · 10-10
Lanthanide-group (La, Nb, Zr, Cm, Ce, Nd, Pm, Sm, Eu, Pu,refr. Ox. Nb, Zr) < 1 · 10-10
11
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2.2 Countermeasures recommended to general public
In a nuclear emergency situation numerous countermeasures are taken to 
protect the population, food chain, livelihood and environment. Precautionary 
countermeasures to protect the population were analysed prior to the workshop 
and discussed by emergency management experts. Since a core meltdown had 
occurred the experts recommended to evacuate the population of the town of 
Loviisa and of the eastern part of Pernaja on the accident day. In addition, 
the recommendations included sheltering during the passage of the plume 
and intake of stable iodine tablets prior to it in the following municipalities: 
Ruotsinpyhtää, Lapinjärvi, Liljendal and in the western part of Pernaja (Figure 
1). This information was available at the outset of the workshop.
12
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3 One week later
3.1 Clean-up techniques
It was assumed that the fallout composition and pattern had been roughly 
mapped (presumably via car and airborne gamma measurements) during the 
first week following the release and that numerous fallout samples had been 
analysed. It was concluded that the caesium and iodine fallout could be explained 
by a release of roughly one percent of the core inventory. Initially prevailing 
uncertainties were considerably lowered, but the dose assessments were still 
believed not to be more accurate than by a factor of 2 or 3.
The release contaminated various surfaces of the living environment. 
The extent to which a contaminated surface contributes to the dose depends on 
various factors: on the type and composition of the deposition, the time spent in 
the proximity of such surfaces and the shielding by building material. Assuming 
normal living conditions, the major contribution to the lifetime dose comes from 
the soil, about 60 – 80%, if the fallout contains caesium (Andersson 1996, Brown 
1996, Moring and Markkula 1997). In urban downtown environments (office 
areas) the main contributors to the dose are walls and roofs, 30 – 60%. Under 
dry deposition situation the contribution of walls is about 5 – 10% and that of 
roads and pavements about 5%. Roofs contribute to about 10%. Because Finnish 
buildings are quite air-tight the lifetime dose from the indoor contamination is 
negligible if the ventilation is shut down during the plume passage.
There is a wide variety of clean-up techniques available for different surfaces. 
In developing decontamination strategies one has to know the distribution of the 
deposited material on different surfaces and the contribution that each surface 
adds up to the dose. Furthermore, one should consider the cost of a technique and 
its feasibility in terms of availability of the equipment and social acceptability. 
Also, the concern of people on their homes, by means of earning their living and 
the effects on the industry are important. The strategies to be considered were 
based on the selection of the surface to be cleaned up, on the choice of a clean-
up technique and / or on the extent of the area to be cleaned up.
The aim of this study was to choose the most appropriate actions for 
cleaning up inhabited areas during summertime. The requirements for the 
actions were that they should be applicable on a large-scale and their early 
implementation is possible. Because of these constraints the equipment had 
to be readily available and preferably in common use. The following clean-up 
techniques were selected for further consideration. Table II (p. 15) gives the dose 
reduction factors estimated for this work (see also Andersson 1996; Moring and 
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Markkula 1997) and Table III (p. 15) contains the estimated costs of the selected 
clean-up techniques.
Buildings and streets
Buildings
In general, fire hosing of roofs and walls with tap water removes relatively 
little activity from building surfaces and has only a minor effect in terms of 
dose reduction. However, in some cases it can be considered, especially in dry 
deposition scenarios, shortly after the accident and for detached houses where 
the dose reduction has been assessed to be moderate. The efficiency of the method 
can be improved significantly by using a brush in order to remove also organic 
materials. High pressure water treatment (through a turbo nozzle) could also be 
used for decontamination of roofs and walls. These techniques have been found 
more efficient when done in the early phase after the deposition, presumably 
due to the time-dependent fixation of caesium ions in the structure of materials. 
Other methods, e.g., sandblasting and ion-exchange, are generally expensive.
A serious problem with hosing and high pressure water treatment is 
controlling the water and aerosols that could contaminate the soil around 
the buildings and thus increase the dose rate. The water has to be collected, 
contaminated soil removed and the waste disposed.
Streets
Wet sweeping or wet vacuum sweeping are suggested for the roads. If municipal 
road-cleaning machines (with rotating brushes and vacuum attachment) or mere 
mechanical rotating brooms on tractors are enough, it would be possible to sweep 
the streets much faster and therefore less expensively. In a series of experiments 
on a freshly contaminated road, the wet vacuum sweeping removed in some cases 
twice as much contaminants as sweeping with an ordinary broom (Andersson 
1996). The efficiency of the method has been found to be greatly dependent on 
the amount of street dust per square meter. 
Fire hosing of streets is assumed to be done with normal tap water or 
with a tanker lorry. In fire hosing water washes the contaminants away from 
the roads into the drainage system for rainwater. Dependent on construction 
of the drainage system the rainwater is either led into the purification system 
and mixed with the purified sewage or led directly into lakes or the sea. During 
sewage purification about half of the contamination remains in the sewage sludge 
and the other half will be released with the purified sewage (Puhakainen 2004) 
and will eventually end up in ditches, rivers, lakes and seas.
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Removal of grass and foliage
Grass
As a decontamination measure, contaminated grass can be cut normally and 
safely deposited. Grass cutting should preferably be done with a cutter that 
has a collector attached. If a collector is not available, the cut grass has to be 
raked up. However, hand raking in large areas is not feasible. The cut grass is 
subsequently collected and buried at a controlled disposal site. If grass cutting 
is done within a few days after the dry deposition it is effective in reducing the 
dose. The transfer process of caesium contamination from grass to soil has been 
found to have a half-life of about 15 days. It is also a cheap method and because 
people can do it by themselves it will also relieve their anxiety.
Grass removal is most effective in a dry deposition situation and when done 
within two weeks after the fallout. After a few weeks it is useless. The method 
can also be considered in wet fallout situations.
Foliage
In addition to grass, trees and bushes are effective interceptors of airborne 
particles. By removing trees and bushes in the vicinity of buildings the dose will 
be reduced considerably, but only if done in the first years. It is assumed that 
branches of deciduous trees are cut off and conifer trees are felled. Leaves have 
to be collected and disposed of in the fall. 
Pruning or felling of trees is effective in dry deposition situations and when 
done in the first month after the fallout. After the first year it is useless. 
Soil
Turf removal
Since the downward migration of caesium is slow, scraping the topsoil will be 
effective for years after the fallout. Soil samples have shown that the fallout 
from the nuclear weapons test explosions in the sixties and from the Chernobyl 
accident can still be detected in the top 30 cm (Ilus 2004). Scraping of turf, about 
5 cm, is assumed to be carried out using a spade in small scale, and a digger and 
a front loader in large areas. The problem with scraping of soil is the generation 
of large amounts of waste. If fertile soil or/and vegetation is removed the method 
should also include reconstruction of land and planting of vegetation.
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Table II. Estimated dose reduction in percents of the effective lifetime dose (70 years) 
for the selected clean-up techniques in a case of dry and wet deposition of 137Cs. 
Type of 
fallout
Roof 
washing 
Wall 
washing
Street 
sweeping 
Tree 
pruning  
Grass 
cutting 
Turf 
removal
Detached houses dry 7 8 4 9 50 60
Wooden wet 7 7 4 1 15 75
Detached houses dry 10 4 4 10 45 58
Brick wet 10 3 4 1 15 72
Row houses dry 6 2 5 6 55 71
wet 4 1 6 1 15 76
Blocks of flats dry 1 3 7 4 59 74
wet 1 2 15 0 15 77
Clean-up action Labour costs 
€ / 1 000 m2
Disposal costs 
€ / 1 000 m2
Waste 
kg / 1 000 m2
Working hours / 1 000 m2, 
per detached house
Street hosing 350 0 0 10
Street sweeping 15 1.6 100 0.3
Roof washing 750 16 10 000 water 33, 
4 h / roof
Wall washing 200 16 10 000 water 11, 
1.7 h / house
Grass cutting 75 0.8 10 3, 
2.5 h / yard
Tree pruning 120 16 0.8 5.3, 
4.3 h/ yard
Turf removal 400 800 75 000 24, 
19 h / yard
Table III. Estimated monetary costs, waste generated and man power needed per unit 
of treated surface area by the selected clean-up techniques. 
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Soil cover
Covering contaminated surfaces with clean soil, concrete or asphalt is most 
applicable in small scale. Covering the contamination with clean soil and scraping 
the topsoil are applicable independent of the type of fallout and the time since 
the accident.
Rotovating, digging or ploughing
In rotovating, the contamination is mixed within the upper 10 – 15 cm of soil 
but when using digging and ploughing methods the contamination is relocated 
somewhat deeper in soil. Digging could be considered in small scale and ploughing 
and rotovating in large urban areas, as in open parks. During deep-ploughing the 
soil is turned up to 45 cm whereas with an ordinary plough to about 25 cm. In 
digging and ploughing, there is no waste generated. An especially advantageous 
solution would be the application of a specially constructed skim and burial 
plough which has approximately the same dose-reducing effect as deep-ploughing 
but leaves the soil quality unaffected. The efficiency of these procedures will 
depend greatly on the soil type. In stony soil and areas having dense vegetation 
the methods are not feasible.
Consequence assessment of clean-up
There are methods which were considered not to be applicable when large 
areas have to be decontaminated and/or during the first weeks of the accident: 
peelable coatings, road planning, skim and burial ploughing and sand blasting. 
These techniques were rejected after a comparison with the above mentioned 
techniques due to their poor effectiveness, high costs or low feasibility.
If no recovery operations are taken, the contamination remains in the 
area. The dose rate will, however, decrease in the course of time through natural 
processes (radioactive decay, weathering, migration to deeper soil layers, wash 
off, resuspension) and human activities (dispersion by vehicle traffic, regular 
cleaning). Unfortunately, it appears no systematic studies of long-term weathering 
and the effect of human activities on dose reduction have been carried out.
The labour costs were estimated to be 25 € / hour including overheads. 
Digger, lorry, front loader and vacuum sweeping costs with a machinist were 
estimated to be 50 € / hour. The workers’ dose, man-hour and the generated waste 
were based on the following assumptions: 
• Roofs and walls are washed using a brush and hosed with tap water. Lift 
frames and lorries are available.
17
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Table IV. Size of the surface areas per house type that is assumed to be treated by 
clean-up actions.
House type Roof 
m2
Walls 
m2
Streets 
m2
Yard1) 
m2
Detached houses 120 150 400 600
Row houses 300 400 700 600
Blocks of flats 450 1 000 1 000 2 000
Other type 120 150 500 600
1) If parks in the area are also in the treated yard, the area should be increased by 100 – 200 m2.
• Grass is cut predominately by residents using small lawn mowers equipped 
with collectors. The grass is put into refuse sacks, the collection of which, 
as well as the waste disposal, are organised by the local officers
• Trees and bushes are pruned or cut mainly by light machinery, collected, 
chipped and disposed of. The work is organised by the local officers in 
cooperation with the local residents.
• Streets are vacuum swept by equipment locally available. Dust and sand 
are collected by lorries and disposed of preferably in surface trenches 
together with other waste.
• Scraping of the turf (5 cm) is done by a digger and assisted by a front loader 
and a lorry. It is assumed that the removed soil is replaced and the yards 
replanted. 
In order to assess the dose, costs and total amount of waste of the various 
clean-up actions, information was needed on the actual size of the treated surfaces 
and on the population distribution. The actual size of the treated areas was 
calculated by multiplying the estimated size of the treated surfaces per house 
type (Table IV) with the number of house type per a square kilometre (Statistics 
Finland). This figure was multiplied with the estimated costs and waste per unit 
of the treated surface area (Table III, p. 15). The avertable collective dose of a 
particular clean-up action was calculated by multiplying the number of persons 
of each square kilometre living in a given house type (Central Statistical Office 
of Finland 1996) with the dose estimate for the relevant house type and square 
kilometre.
18
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Disposal of generated waste
Grass, undervegetation, litter, humus and soil have to be disposed of as such. 
Wood material can also be disposed of as it is, but chipping trees, branches and 
stumps will help the disposal and rotting of material. In all cases, the final 
disposal cannot be undertaken before the organic material is rotten.
Studies of clean-up strategies in forest environments indicate that burning 
of wood before disposal is an attractive alternative both to reduce the amount 
of waste and to gain some monetary benefit (Lehto 1994). There are small (5 
MW) and large (20 – 200 MW) power stations suitable for burning chipped wood 
material in Finland. If proper electrostatic precipitators are used, 95 – 99% of 
radionuclides will remain in the ash. The amount of waste ash to be disposed of 
would be small. However, there will remain some concern, especially among the 
population living in the vicinity of the power stations, when burning radioactive 
material.
Disposing of the ash of the burned wood and cut grass (after rotting) from 
highly contaminated areas will cause high individual doses to the workers. Since 
tens of mSv can be expected, special working arrangements are needed.
3.2 Fallout area and consequence assessments
The site of the hypothetical accident is situated 90 km east from the capital area 
of Finland and 10 km southeast from Loviisa town. There are 7600 inhabitants 
in Loviisa and over one million inhabitants in the whole fallout area (Table V, 
Figure 2).
There was rain in Loviisa, Liljendal, Lapinjärvi, Pernaja and Ruotsinpyhtää 
during the plume passage, which caused wet deposition in parts of these 
municipalities (over 50 kBq / m2). Close to the nuclear power plant the measured 
fallout was over 5 000 kBq / m2. Elsewhere up to Mäntsälä the fallout was 
5 – 50 kBq / m2 and a decade lower in the capital area of Finland.
The 134Cs fallout was equal in magnitude to the one from 137Cs, and the 
deposition of 131I was ten times higher. In this scenario the lifetime dose is mainly 
caused by caesium isotopes and only a few percents are caused by iodine. The dose 
rate was high during the first week after the accident as a result of the iodine 
fallout. This had to be taken into account when planning clean-up actions.
A dynamic compartment model had been developed earlier at STUK to 
assess the transfer of caesium within the urban environment and to calculate the 
dose savings for the selected decontamination techniques (Moring and Markkula 
1997). In this model, the Finnish house types and living habits were taken into 
account and matched the house type statistics from Statistics Finland.
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Figure 2. The caesium deposition, affected municipalities and population centres (grey 
areas).
Table V. Municipalities in the fallout area and the number of inhabitants. 
Artjärvi 1 570 Kerava 30 482 Pernaja 3 783
Askola 4 421 Kärkölä 4 978 Pornainen 4 186
Espoo 216 836 Lapinjärvi 2 995 Porvoo 45 403
Hausjärvi 8 173 Liljendal 1 464 Pukkila 1 936
Helsinki 559 718 Loviisa 7 498 Riihimäki 26 268
Hyvinkää 42 736 Myrskylä 1 974 Ruotsinpyhtää 2 967
Iitti 7 415 Mäntsälä 16 908 Sipoo 17 760
Järvenpää 36 380 Nurmijärvi 34 029 Tuusula 32 915
Kauniainen 8 543 Orimattila 14 202 Vantaa 179 856
20
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Figure 3. Subdivision of the fallout area for consequence assessment.
Table VI. Key figures for the 5 areas and the consequence assessment if no actions 
are taken.
Area NPP Area 1 Area 2 Area 3 Area 4
Number of population 28 8 429 6 070 29 600 1 101 614
Number of houses 25 2 191 2 487 10 845 14 4025
137Cs fallout (kBq / m2) 7 423 1 145 273 8 2
Dose in days 1–7 (mSv) 19 3 1 0 0
Dose in days 7–30 (mSv) 36 5 1 0 0
Dose in days 7–365 (mSv) 287 44 11 0 0
70-year dose (mSv) 2 263 213 73 2 0
Collective dose, 70 y (manSv) 63 1 797 440 67 283
Increased cancer cases 6 180 44 7 28
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Figure 4. Loviisa town and the Area NPP (marked 
with ochre).
The fallout pattern of iodine and caesium isotopes, the dose rate and the 
doses received within the first week were calculated by the RODOS system 
(Ehrhardt and Weis 2000). In this work script and spreadsheet softwares 
were developed to calculate the collective doses, workers’ dose, volumes of 
waste generated and the monetary costs of actions for various possible action 
strategies. 
For the purpose of the analysis of the clean-up recommendations, the major 
fallout area was subdivided into 5 areas (Area NPP and Areas 1 to 4 in Figure 3) 
according to the caesium fallout but taking into account the demographic and 
administrative features. With the exception of the municipalities of Loviisa, 
Pernaja and Ruotsinpyhtää (which were divided such that the dividing line 
passed through sparsely populated areas), the subdivision was made along the 
municipality borders. Table VI gives an assessment of the consequence within 
these areas if no clean-up actions are performed. 
Area NPP is the most contaminated area but it has only 28 inhabitants 
(Figure 4). The 137Cs fallout was more than 5 000 kBq / m2 in that area and the 
dose rate caused by the fallout was 0.6 mSv / h in the first hours after the plume 
passage. The estimated 70-year dose is over 2 000 mSv. 
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Area 1 consists of Loviisa town and the eastern part of the municipality of 
Pernaja. The average 137Cs fallout was 1 000 kBq / m2 in that area. The NPP and 
Loviisa were evacuated prior to the release and the inhabitants of Pernaja were 
recommended to take iodine tablets and to shelter indoors during the plume 
passage. If the inhabitants of Loviisa returned to their homes one week after 
their evacuation they would receive a dose of 5 mSv by the end of June and 213 
mSv in 70 years. These figures might be put into perspective by comparing them 
to the dose that the inhabitants of that area receive from the inhalation of radon, 
which is estimated to be 7 mSv in one year and 500 mSv in 70 years.
Area 2 encompasses Liljendal, Lapinjärvi and the southern part of 
Ruotsinpyhtää. The fallout was very uneven in these municipalities and the 
estimated population weighted average was 270 kBq / m2. The inhabitants were 
recommended to take iodine tablets and to shelter indoors during the plume 
passage.
There was no rain in other areas during the plume passage and the 137Cs 
fallout ranged between 5 and 50 kBq / m2 in Area 3 and between 0.5 and 5 in 
Area 4.
An avertable effective dose of 50 mSv in a week is used as the planning 
criteria for evacuation in Finland. Permanent resettlement of the population is 
recommended if the avertable lifetime dose is 1000 mSv (IAEA 1994, ICRP 1993). 
On the grounds of these intervention levels permanent resettlement in Area 
NPP is justified and continuing the evacuation of Loviisa town for one or three 
weeks could be considered due to the high iodine fallout. These were, in addition 
to clean-up actions, the alternatives that the participants of the workshop could 
choose from. 
Tables VII – XII give an assessment of the tangible consequences of the 
feasible actions within each area. A wide range of strategies can be defined 
and assessed by using the information given in these tables. For example, the 
evacuation of the population in Area 1 could be prolonged for another week, the 
roofs and walls of their houses could be cleaned, the contaminated grass removed 
from their yards and some trees felled in front of their houses; similar clean-up 
actions could be implemented in Area 2, and grass cutting and street cleaning 
in Areas 3 and 4. An assessment of the consequences of such a strategy is easily 
made with the data of Tables VII – XII.
The workers’ dose was estimated by considering the time in which each 
action should be completed. It was assumed that sweeping of streets, washing of 
houses and cutting of grass should and could be done in one week, pruning of the 
vegetation in two weeks and scraping the topsoil in three weeks. In addition to 
the dose caused by the clean-up action itself, i.e., the dose received outdoors, the 
dose caused by transportation and waste disposal was roughly estimated by using 
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Table VII. Consequence assessment for permanent resettlement of the population of 
Area NPP.
Permanent resettlement
Average avertable dose (mSv) 2 260
Avertable collective dose (manSv) 63
Avertable number of cancer cases 6
Costs (M €) 400
Table VIII. Consequence assessment for evacuation and permanent resettlement of 
the population of Area 1.
Evacuation 
days 7 – 14
Evacuation 
days 7 – 30
Permanent 
resettlement
Average avertable dose (mSv) 2 5 210
Avertable collective dose manSv) 17 46 1 800
Avertable number of cancer cases 2 5 180
Costs (M €) 5.5 16 5 100
Table IX. Consequence assessment of clean-up actions in Area 1.
Washing 
roofs
Washing 
walls
Vacuum 
sweeping 
streets
Grass 
cutting
Pruning 
vegetat.
Scraping 
topsoil
Average avertable 
dose (mSv)
11 10 8 27 2 120
Avertable collective 
dose (manSv)
90 84 70 230 17 1 030
Avertable number 
of cancer cases
9 8 7 23 2 103
Costs (M €), 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 1.7
Worker dose (manSv) 0 0 0 0 0 1
Waste (1 000 kg) 3 080 4 300 96 14 1 108 000
Working days 1 300 590 36 540 960 4 300
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Table XI. Consequence assessment of clean-up actions in Area 3.
Washing 
roofs
Washing 
walls
Vacuum 
sweeping 
streets
Grass 
cutting
Pruning 
vegetat.
Scraping 
topsoil
Average avertable 
dose (mSv)
0 0 0 1 0 1
Avertable collective 
dose (manSv)
4 4 2 23 4 32
Avertable number 
of cancer cases
0 0 0 0 0 3
Costs (M €), 1.1 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.9 8
Worker dose (manSv) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Waste (1 000 kg) 13 900 17 800 450 66 5 497 000
Working days 5 700 2 450 168 2 490 4 400 19 900
Washing 
roofs
Washing 
walls
Vacuum 
sweeping 
streets
Grass 
cutting
Pruning 
vegetat.
Scraping 
topsoil
Average avertable 
dose (mSv)
4 4 2 9 1 42
Avertable collective 
dose (manSv)
24 23 14 56 4 250
Avertable number 
of cancer cases
2 2 1 6 0 25
Costs (M €), 0.2 0.1 0 0.1 0.2 1.8
Worker dose (manSv) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Waste (1 000 kg) 3 200 4 000 103 15 1 113 000
Working days 1 300 550 39 560 990 4 500
Table X. Consequence assessment of clean-up actions in Area 2.
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Table XII. Consequence assessment of clean-up actions in Area 4.
Vacuum sweeping 
streets
Grass cutting
Average avertable dose (mSv) 0 0
Avertable collective dose (manSv) 10 110
Avertable number of cancer cases 1 11
Costs (M €) 1.2 8.1
Worker dose (manSv) 0 0
Waste (1 000 kg) 7 000 1 070
Working days 2 600 40 000
the MATERIA and MicroShield softwares (Markkanen 1995; MicroShield 1996). 
Certain work stages, such as driving a full load in a machinery and especially 
disposing onto an open waste trench, might cause doses which exceed the dose 
limits for workers. For example, it was estimated that the 137Cs activity in 1 m3 
of vacuum swept waste was 10 000 000 kBq and it alone caused the dose of 
0.1 – 0.2 mSv in an hour and 1 – 2 mSv in a day to a driver of machinery in the 
town of Loviisa.
The evacuation and permanent resettlement costs were assessed applying 
methods presented in the COCO model (Haywood et al. 1991) and the RODOS 
system (Hasemann 2000).
The intervention measures entail also non-radiological risks to the 
population and the workers caused by various kinds of accidents, for example, 
during washing roofs, cutting grass and felling down trees. The risks that are 
directly associated with remedial actions were estimated using Finnish statistics 
(Central Statistical Office of Finland 2003). The Statistical Yearbook, however, 
does not directly give the accident statistic for clean-up actions considered here 
and therefore the risk was estimated using accident risks in transportation, 
construction and forestry. The accident rate was not significant; if all the clean-
up actions are taken in Loviisa town, one statistical accident might happen. 
However, if houses are washed in the Helsinki metropolitan area, circa 20 
accidents might happen.
Before the workshop eight tentative strategies were defined and their 
tangible attributes assessed. The strategies were presented as combinations of 
different countermeasures to show in detail the different actions in each strategy 
and also to show the participants how new strategies could be defined during 
the workshop (Tables XIII – XIV, p. 26).
26
STUK-A214
Table XIII. The tentative definition of strategies (see also colour codes in Figure 3, p. 
20).
Strategy
Clean-up action max A B C D E min 0
Permanent resettlement L
Evacuation, days 7 – 30 L L L L
Evacuation, days 7 – 14 L
Washing of houses L++ L++ L++ L+ L L
Sweeping of streets H H H L++ L+ L L
Pruning of vegetation L++ L++ L++ L+ L L
Cutting grass H H L++ L++ L+ L L
Scraping of topsoil L++ L+ L+ L L
L comprise Loviisa and eastern part of Pernaja;
L+ comprise in addition to L: Liljendal, Lapinjärvi and southern part of Ruotsinpyhtää;
L++ comprise in addition to  L+: western part of Pernaja, Myrskylä, Askola, Pukkila, Pornainen  
and Mäntsälä;
H comprise in addition to L++: Artjärvi, Orimattila, Kärkölä, Hausjärvi, Riihimäki, Hyvinkää, Porvoo, Sipoo,  
Järvenpää, Kerava, Tuusula, Nurmijärvi, Vantaa, Espoo, Kauniainen and Helsinki. 
Notes:
• Area NPP will be resettled in every strategy
• Grass will not be cut in areas where surface soil will be scraped
• In Strategy max no cleaning actions will be carried out in area L
Table XIV. The health consequences and costs of the strategies.
Strategy
Attributes max A B C D E min 0
Cancer incidents 36 83 94 114 120 210 231 261
Saved cancer incidents 225 178 167 147 141 51 30 0
Costs of clean-up actions (M €) 22 17 9 4 2 1 0 0
Costs of relocation (M €) 5 100 16 16 16 16 6 0 0
Overall costs (M €) 5 122 33 25 20 19 6 0 0
Note. The actions taken during the first week are not included in the numbers.
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4 Workshop on clean-up actions
4.1 Workshop arrangements
The facilitated workshop was assumed to be organised a week after the accident. 
Prior to the workshop many personal contacts were made in order to build up 
a group of key players and to collect local background information. It was seen 
important that also persons living in the contaminated area were present in the 
workshop. Therefore, people who due to their occupation had a role in performing 
clean-up actions and who also lived in Loviisa town were invited. The following 
list shows the organisations which were considered to be necessary for the 
decision making process and the number of their representatives:
• Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, one participant
• Ministry of Interior, one participant
• County Administrative Board of Southern Finland, Rescue Office, one 
participant
• Town of Loviisa, Rescue Office, one participant
• Town of Loviisa, Technical Office, three participants
• Federation of municipalities of Loviisa region, one participant
• Employment and Economic Development Centre for Uusimaa,  one 
participant
• Environment Agency of Uusimaa, two participants
• Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, STUK, two participants.
The workshop was facilitated by Prof. Raimo P. Hämäläinen, Helsinki 
University of Technology (HUT), and assisted by three technical analysts from 
HUT. STUK provided a secretary and two persons who assisted the workshop 
on radiological and other technical issues. A representative from the EVATECH 
project was also present.
A portable decision support system was used to support the decision 
analysis in the workshop. It consisted of seven portable notebooks, a wireless 
local area network, projectors and the Web-based multicriteria decision analytical 
software called Web–HIPRE1 (Mustajoki and Hämäläinen 2000, Mustajoki et 
al. 2004) (Figure 5, p. 28). Web-HIPRE was used for the decision modelling and 
analysing the results. It provided a multi-attribute value theory (MAVT) -based 
approach for modelling the preferences of individual decision makers. It also 
provided a way to aggregate individual models into a group model, an aspect 
1 http://www.hipre.hut.fi
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Figure 5. The technical arrangements.
that made it specially suitable for the workshop, as it made it possible to collect 
and combine the results of individual groups.
Before the workshop, all the participants received an information package 
containing a description of the accident scenario, potential clean-up techniques, 
and consequence assessments for tentative strategies. In addition, information 
was provided on the tasks of the participants in nuclear emergency management 
and on risk perspectives in different radiation exposure situations. At the 
beginning of the workshop, the facilitator gave an overview of the facilitated 
workshop method, and of the main features and steps of the decision analysis. 
A radiation protection expert briefed about the accident, the consequences of 
the clean-up techniques and their effectiveness. At the end of the introduction 
phase, the health risks due to radiation exposure from this hypothetical accident 
were compared with other exposure situations to get a view of the severity of 
the accident. The presentations took about one hour.
The participants formed six groups. Each group was equipped with a 
notebook computer that allowed them to interact directly with Web-HIPRE. 
Except for two, the participants had no earlier experience in decision workshops 
or decision support, which placed high demands on the usability of the system. 
The workshop lasted for seven hours, which seemed to be convenient for 
participation. At any rate, it would have been difficult for the participants to 
allocate more time than this. As in a real situation, the time frame was so tight 
that preparatory meetings were needed to prepare the materials and develop 
tentative strategies.
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4.2 Attributes relevant for the analysis
The facilitator started the decision analysis by presenting the tentative strategies 
to protect the population and showed their consequences (Tables XIII and XIV, 
p. 26). Then he led the participants to discuss the issues and concerns they had 
when considering the protective actions included. During the discussion key 
words and their definitions were written down and projected on the screen to be 
reviewed by everybody. This brainstorming took about one hour.
Communication with the public and the media was considered a crucial 
issue. The risk perceived, in addition to health effects, can have serious economical 
and social consequences, e.g., to the industry. Public opinion and perceptions of 
risk could result in consequences which may reduce the benefits of the actions, 
make their implementation impossible or even lead to too excessive actions. For 
example, the people (and the industry) might not accept any products from the 
contaminated area although the contamination would be removed very efficiently. 
The industry might think that the risk of being discredited by using contaminated 
materials is too great, and thus refuse to use even slightly contaminated raw 
materials. Nevertheless, it was concluded that whether the communication 
succeeded or not it does not depend on the strategies.
Psychological stress could lead to health effects of a comparable nature 
to those arising from the contamination and, at the same time, reduce the 
quality of life significantly. A majority of the inhabitants in a contaminated area 
may show varying degrees of stress reactions in response to the accident, but 
stress could also be a consequence of a protective action. The accident will be 
comprehended and evaluated also through the protective measures and it will 
be felt more severe if aggressive measures, e.g., removing soil and trees in the 
gardens, are taken. Appropriate actions, however, will offer reassurance to the 
population that it is safe to live in the affected area. Especially measures that 
people could implement by themselves are the most effective in reducing stress. 
Because people will be concerned and stressed about living in a contaminated 
area, actions that do not directly relate to radiological actions (for example 
counselling and psychological support in the crisis) are needed to reduce the 
psychological effects of an accident.
Protective actions would cause monetary costs to individual house and 
land owners, the industry and the society. The costs would include transportation 
costs, loss of income, costs of guarding the area and costs of lost capital services. 
Also, the question of reimbursing individual owners for any protective actions 
was raised. If any compensation is paid, either in full or in part, it would mean 
that the costs to individuals would now be costs to the society. Nuclear Acts, 
the Radiation Safety Act and Nuclear Liability Acts aim to cover all nuclear 
accidents in Finland.
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The clean-up actions are dependent on the decision how the waste 
generated would be treated. According to the Finnish Law, it is possible to bury 
the radioactive waste, but it will be difficult to do so in practice. For example, the 
town of Loviisa does not have its own dumping place but the general procedures 
for clean-up actions imply that the generated waste is to be buried in the 
contaminated area (Lehto 1994). It is expected that every burial site would be 
objected to by various stakeholders.
The recommendations of international organisations (ICRP 1991, 1993, 
2000; IAEA 1994, 1996; OECD/NEA 1990) are not based on the application of dose 
limits or any predetermined limits for deciding on the intervention. However, the 
position of workers carrying out recovery operations is different. These actions, 
albeit in response to an accident, can be planned and optimized in advance, and 
therefore it is recommended that workers undertaking recovery operations should 
be subject to the normal radiation protection system and the related dose limits 
should be followed. The workers should carry personal individual dose meters. It 
was concluded that by careful planning of the work, education and dose control 
the workers’ dose could be restricted to a few mSv.
Finally, all the relevant issues were grouped into different categories 
(Table XV) which formed the basis for the value tree. The key words were 
examined for suitability to measure the performance of the tentative strategies, 
readjusted and gradually the value tree of Figure 6 (p. 32) was agreed upon by 
the group. The strategy ‘max’, which meant the permanent resettlement of the 
population of Loviisa (see Table XIII, p. 26), was rejected for several reasons: it 
was considered overly excessive and would cause serious anxiety, some citizens 
would most likely be unwilling to move, and it would be difficult to define the 
limits of the evacuation area. It would also cause undesirable effects on the 
country’s international reputation. Moreover, it is extremely expensive to organize 
the permanent resettlement of large population groups.
4.3 Analysis of the problem
Seven selected intervention strategies (all the strategies except the Strategy 
‘max’ in Table XIII, p. 26) were accepted as a working hypothesis for the decision 
analysis. For these strategies the values of the ‘hard’ attributes, i.e., the costs 
and health effects, were calculated in advance (Table XIV, p. 26). The degree 
of performance of each strategy with respect to these attributes was encoded 
by a linear value function. This meant, for example, that one cancer case was 
effectively perceived to be as great a loss to the society independent of how many 
cancer cases are expected.
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Overall goal: Healthy residential environment
Health
Deterministic radiation related health effects: None
Occupational accidents: Some, but not a significant issue. Very few new traffic accidents.
Other Accidents: Some minor accidents.
Cancer incidents: Calculated over 70 years. Cancer incidents will be compared with those caused by radon entering 
houses from the ground. During the same period in Loviisa such cases are circa 100.
Immediate mental disturbances: Crisis support and counselling will be organized and available. General concerns will 
be considered under the socio-psychological attribute below.
Socio-psychological
Communication/Media: Active communication is vitally important and should be paid high attention. Can fail in the 
early hours but also in a later phase.
Reassurance: Also international aspects will be taken into account in this attribute as well as the following main 
issues: 
• Credibility of countermeasures
• Credibility of the authorities
Anxiety of the population: The effects of too excessive actions will also be considered.
Environment
Residential environment: Quality of life and living after clean-up actions.
Surroundings: Restrictions in the consumption of game, wild mushrooms and berries.
Nature: Clean-up actions will lower the contamination left in the nature.
Water pathways: Contamination flowing into the sea will be diluted into an insignificant level of radioactivity.
Drinking water resources: Can be protected and taken care of. Contaminated waste will be located away from 
groundwater supplies. 
Time span: Vegetation will regenerate.
Economy
Foreign trade: Credibility of the safety of products. Can it be influenced by countermeasures?
Continuation of industries and employment: Income losses will be compensated.
International reputation 
Lost value of assets and properties: If firms go out of business it will be compensated, no compensation in the case 
of spontaneous relocation.
Age distribution in Loviisa: A high proportion is retired people.
Spontaneous relocation of population: Could take place in the beginning.
Direct clean-up costs: A nuclear accident fund is available following international conventions. It will cover all the 
clean-up actions.
Technical issues 
Technical feasibility: If cleaning actions are planned well they can all be accomplished.
Adequacy of labour force: The number of workers needed is not high (less than a thousand, recruitment of labour 
can be managed by an adequate compensation level, industrial safety legislation remains in effect, dose control for 
workers.
Availability of cleaning and other equipment: Not a problem.
Table XV. Development and definition of the attributes. 
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Figure 6. The value tree developed and used in the analysis.
The ‘soft’ attributes, such as intactness of the urban environment and 
anxiety, were directly rated by each group. In the technique used, the most 
preferred strategy with respect to each attribute was given a score of one and the 
least preferred strategy a score of zero. The other strategies were given scores 
between zero and one, according to their performance level. It was noted that the 
decimal number could be interpreted as a percentage of the maximum value. 
In order to make the scores between the attributes commensurable with 
each other, the attributes were weighted according to their importance. This 
was done by each group separately with the Web-HIPRE software. In problem 
situations analysts familiar with the software provided assistance. The weights 
represented the relative importance that each group gave to the attributes with 
respect to their ranges. The result was a preference model of each group.
The Swing method (von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986) was used to elicit 
the weights of the attributes. In this method all the attributes were initially at 
their lowest preference levels and the participants were asked, if just one of the 
attributes could be moved to its best level, which one they would choose. This 
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Figure 7. The group model.
attribute was given 100 points. After this change, the participants were asked 
which attribute they would next preferably choose to be moved to its best level, 
and so on until all the attributes had been ranked. These other attributes were 
given points reflecting the relative importance of their swings from the lowest 
to the highest level compared to the corresponding swing in the first ranked 
attribute. The facilitator stressed the participants to consider the attribute ranges 
when assessing the weights. The actual weights of the attributes were obtained 
by normalizing the sum of the given points to one.
Finally, the decision makers’ preferences over the strategies were 
incorporated into the overall values of the strategies. These were derived with 
an additive model, i.e., by summing up the weighted scores of the attributes. 
As a result, each group got overall values for the strategies that reflected their 
preference judgements. The individual models were saved on the server and the 
results were projected on the screen and analyzed collectively one by one. The 
individual models were also aggregated into a group model, in which each element 
on the criteria level described the corresponding group (Figure 7). The scores for 
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these elements were the group’s individual overall values for each strategy. The 
overall group values for the strategies were obtained as a weighted sum of the 
overall values of each group so that each group element was equally weighted.
4.4 Results
The overall values of the strategies and some examples of sensitivity analyses 
that were carried out collaboratively in the workshop are shown in Figures 
8.1 – 8.6 (p. 35 – 40). The overall values are divided into segments according the 
impacts of the different attributes to the overall values. The sensitivity analyses 
indicate the changes in the overall values of the alternatives when adjusting the 
weight of an attribute. These figures also show what factors are important and 
affected in the ranking. For example, it can be seen that costs were not decisive 
for any group but the ranking resulted due to other attributes. Only one group 
(group 5) assigned a bit higher weight to the costs. Although each interest group 
carried out value judgement independently, the resulting rankings had some 
aspects in common. Strategies 0, i.e. doing nothing, and min scored low within 
all groups. Any other strategy offered considerably better dose savings. Strategy 
E was also ranked low because of weak dose savings and low benefit of socio-
psychological factors. Strategies A, B, C and D were ranked the best at least by 
one group.
As mentioned earlier, all the models were aggregated into a group model 
(Figure 9, p. 41). The aggregated group values are evenly weighted average 
overall values of the groups. The segments show the impact that the groups 
have on the overall value. This model also reflects the predominant preference 
for strategies A, B, C and D.
The strategy C was ranked the best in the group model. It was taken as a 
basis for a new strategy C* to further improve the performance of the clean-up 
actions with the insight gained during the analysis (Table XVI, p. 42). In this 
strategy, the evacuation was not seen to be strict but the house owners (however 
not children) could enter the area and guide and participate in the clean-up 
actions. Vacuum sweeping would be done in any case in the whole fallout area (H). 
Residents could be urged to cut the grass in their yards. The contaminated grass 
would be collected and disposed of by the municipalities. Because scraping of the 
topsoil is, compared to grass removal, much more effective in reducing the dose in 
a wet deposition situation, it was recommended to be done in the whole rain area. 
The consequences were calculated during the workshop (Table XVII, p. 42).
Rating of intangible attributes and attribute weights were discussed within 
the group and the model was recalculated with the new strategy C*. An example 
of the ranking of the strategies for group 1 is shown in Figure 10 (p. 41). 
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Figure 8.1. Evaluation of strategies by group 1: Overall values and 
Sensitivity analysis on Urban Environment.
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Figure 8.2. Evaluation of strategies by group 2: Overall values and 
Sensitivity analysis on Urban Environment.
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Figure 8.3. Evaluation of strategies by group 3: overall values and 
sensitivity analysis on Health.
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Figure 8.4. Evaluation of strategies by group 4: overall values and sensitivity 
analysis on Socio-Psychological.
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Figure 8.5. Evaluation of strategies by group 5: overall values and sensitivity 
analysis on Costs.
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Figure 8.6. Evaluation of strategies by group 6: overall values and sensitivity 
analysis on Urban Environment. 
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Figure 9. The average overall values of the groups for each strategy. 
Figure 10. Overall values of the strategies with developed new strategy 
C*.
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Table XVII. The health and costs consequence of strategies.
Strategy
Attributes max A B C* C D E min 0
Cancer incidents 36 83 94 84 114 120 210 231 261
Saved cancer incidents 225 178 167 177 147 141 51 30 0
Costs of clean-up actions (M €) 22 17 9 14 4 2 1 0 0
Costs of relocation (M €) 5100 16 16 13 16 16 6 0 0
Overall costs (M €) 5122 33 25 27 20 19 6 0 0
Note. The actions taken in the first week are not included in the numbers.
Table XVI. The definition of strategies (see also colour codes in Figure 3, p. 20).
Strategy
Clean-up action max A B C* C D E min 0
Permanent resettlement L
Evacuation, days 7 – 30 L L (L) L L
Evacuation, days 7 – 14 L
Washing of houses L++ L++ L++ L+ L+ L L
Sweeping of streets H H H H L++ L+ L L
Pruning of vegetation L++ L++ L++ L+ L+ L L
Cutting grass H H L++ H L++ L+ L L
Scraping of topsoil L++ L+ L+ L+ L L
L comprise Loviisa and eastern part of Pernaja;
L+ comprise in addition to L: Liljendal, Lapinjärvi and southern part of Ruotsinpyhtää;
L++ comprise in addition to  L+: western part of Pernaja, Myrskylä, Askola, Pukkila, Pornainen and 
Mäntsälä;
H comprise in addition to L++: Artjärvi, Orimattila, Kärkölä, Hausjärvi, Riihimäki, Hyvinkää, Porvoo, Sipoo, 
Järvenpää,  
Kerava, Tuusula, Nurmijärvi, Vantaa, Espoo, Kauniainen and Helsinki. 
Notes:
• Area NPP will be resettled in every strategy
• Grass will not be cut in areas where surface soil will be scraped
• In Strategy max no cleaning actions will be carried out in area L
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4.5 Evaluation by the participants 
At the end of the workshop the participants were asked to fill in a questionnaire 
(Table XVIII, p. 44). The overall tendency in the replies was that the participants 
strongly agreed with the statements in the questionnaire. The most modest 
agreement was in the statement ‘all key players including residents of contaminated 
area should participate in the strategy planning’. As in earlier workshops 
organised in Finland, all the participants considered that the workshop was 
useful in general. 12 of 13 participants even fully agreed. All the participants also 
at least partly agreed that a similar approach could be valuable for training and 
exercises. The attitude towards an application of the workshop in the case of an 
emergency was slightly less agreed. It was quite strongly agreed that facilitated 
workshops should be part of emergency exercises. If this would happen it means 
that a new culture has been created in the emergency management training. 
The format of the facilitated workshop and decision analysis were seen to 
provide the meeting with useful features. It has been argued in decision analysis 
literature that decision analysis makes decisions more open and transparent, 
keeps discussion focused on key issues and helps to understand the views of 
the other participants. The participants agreed with these arguments. Further, 
they echoed the view that the analysis reveals the key factors and helps to 
communicate with the inhabitants, authorities and media. In the literature it 
has been recognized that the improved communication might sometimes be the 
most important outcome of the analysis (Kadvany 1995).
Although most participants were not familiar with the Web-HIPRE 
evaluation software, they felt that it was easy to use the software and to 
understand the ranking method as well as the sensitivity analysis. This attitude 
was more positive than in earlier workshops (Ammann et al. 2001). Generally, it 
was seen that the ranking that emerged from the decision analysis corresponded 
to intuitive expectations.
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Table XVIII. Summary of the feedback from the participants after the workshop by 
means of the number of participants that agree or disagree with the propositions.
Statement Fully 
disagree
Partly 
disagree
Can’t 
say
Partly 
agree
Fully 
agree
All key players (incl. residents of the 
contaminated area) should participate 
in the strategy planning.
2 1 1 5 3
The workshop is a suitable approach to form 
a general view in emergency planning.
4 8
The workshop is a suitable approach to 
form a general view in a real emergency. 
1 7 5
The workshop is suitable for finding an optimal 
strategy during training and exercises. 
4 9
The workshop is suitable for finding an 
optimal strategy in a real emergency.
4 5 4
The application of the decision analysis made 
the decision more open and transparent.
2 5 6
Decision analysis keeps discussion focused 
on key issues and helps to understand 
the views of other key players. 
5 8
Decision analysis reveals the key factors 
and helps to communicate with the 
inhabitants, authorities and media. 
1 10 2
The information distributed prior and during 
the workshop was sufficient to understand 
the situation and to make the best choice. 
2 9 1
The workshop method should be a 
part of emergency exercise.
2 4 7
It was easy to understand the ranking 
method and use the Web-HIPRE software. 
2 7 4
The ranking of the alternatives from 
the Web-HIPRE analysis corresponds 
to your own a prior ranking.
1 1 8 3
The sensitivity analysis of model parameters 
was useful, i.e., it provided more 
information about the situation decision.
1 5 7
The workshop was useful in general. 1 12
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5 Discussion
As in earlier workshops the questionnaire reveals that key players consider 
this type exercising important, and indeed, a proposal was made to organise 
workshops regularly as a part of the preparedness. Also, more participants were 
eager to participate than was appropriate considering the workshop format 
and the size of the meeting room. One reason is, as noted already in earlier 
workshops and other exercises, that there is a great desire to consider the later 
phase issues in nuclear emergency management such as foodstuffs and clean-
up actions. This is not the only explanation. The very positive attitude towards 
the workshop and decision analysis methods could stem from the fact that the 
participants experience such a structured meeting format useful. The second 
reason could be that many participants were inhabitants of Loviisa town – local 
officers as well as residents of Loviisa. The potential victims of a possible accident 
were planning protective actions which one day could be their real concern. The 
negative issue is that a lot of time is needed to do all the preparations and the 
realistic calculations. For example, in this case, despite the experience gained 
in the earlier workshops, several person months were spent on this new case 
by the working team. However, we believe that this kind of work will result in 
new practical approaches and improved preparedness in nuclear emergency 
management.
The argument on the questionnaire ‘all key players including residents 
of the contaminated area should participate in the strategy planning’ was least 
strongly agreed upon but was still clearly positive. It is a new approach in 
nuclear emergency management that the affected public actually participates in 
a fair and competent decision-making process instead of just passively hearing 
them (Renn et al. 1995; Susskind and Field 1996; Beierle and Cayford 2002). An 
observation made from this and earlier polls supports the view that a workshop 
is a suitable approach in the planning phase of a decision making process where 
all stakeholders with expertise in different areas analyse and evaluate strategies 
together (Sinkko et al. 2004). Stakeholders and authorities might still be a bit 
suspicious that public participation could improve decision and thus causing 
the slight disagreement in the public participation. It could be useful to develop 
further public participation in similar facilitated workshops.
A finding of our previous workshops was that the relevant key players 
see one day as a convenient duration for the workshop (Hämäläinen et al. 1998, 
2000; Ammann et al. 2001). A shorter time would cause problems, as it is very 
time-consuming to start from scratch, to define the attributes and assure that 
all participants understand their meaning similarly. The problem structuring 
is not an easy task (Belton and Stewart 2002). Therefore, in earlier workshops 
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we have found it useful to create a set of attributes in advance to be discussed 
in the beginning of the workshop. In the workshop the facilitator stressed the 
preliminary character of the attributes and urged the participants to revise 
them whenever necessary. This time we didn’t start from a predefined set of 
attributes but we started with brainstorming, elicited key words and defined 
their meaning using a text editor. The build up of the value tree was done in 
less than two hours. As nuclear accidents are rare and all key players are not 
very familiar with the radiological issues or the decision analysis approach, the 
process had to be guided by the facilitator in order to assure a suitable set of 
attributes, i.e., one for which consequence assessments are available. This kind of 
an approach demands, however, that the facilitator is familiar with the concepts 
and terminology of nuclear emergency management.
It was quite evident that clean-up actions are not totally independent of 
evacuation or permanent resettlement in a heavy fallout situation like the one 
assumed in Loviisa. It was noted that attributes, such as the costs and social 
disruption, would be important and would differentiate between strategies if 
long-time population movements are included in the strategies. Once it was 
concluded that the permanent resettlement is the most recommendable option 
in the NPP area and one to two weeks evacuation of Loviisa and the eastern 
part of Pernaja, the ranking of clean-up strategies was dependent only on health, 
socio-psychological and environment attributes. Feasibility was not considered 
to be a problem in any of the strategies considered.
During the discussion it was proposed that special plans should be made 
in advance to be prepared in the case of an emergency. For example, in Loviisa 
there is no dumping area and yet it is reasonable to dispose the waste generated 
in the clean-up within the contaminated area. A new or a temporary dumping 
area can not be planned in a short time but planning in advance is needed.
During the final discussion it was asked whether the analysis and engaged 
dialogue have helped to understand the health risks. In the literature it has been 
found that those people who participate in planning or mitigation actions perceive 
the risk to be lower than those who do not participate (Arvai 2003). Susskind 
and Field (1996) and Slovic (1997) have also proposed that public involvement 
improves risk management and risk communication. During the process the 
consequences of different actions are assessed and the risks can be easily 
compared. The risks were seen to be better comprehended by the participants. 
Hence the facilitated workshops could also have a role in risk communication, 
helping the population to assess their risk attitudes realistically.
The facilitated workshop method could be very successful in improving 
the quality of the decision and resolving conflicts among competing interests 
of key players. It could motivate the participants and enhance the quality of 
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the deliberation, and the degree of the public control could be set by public 
participation (Sinkko et al. 2004). There is a danger that the participation of 
a small group tends to narrow down the incorporation of public values in the 
decision, and the education and informing of the public (Beierle and Cayford 
2002). Attention should be paid to the responsibility of participants in intensive 
communication to those whose spokesman they are. A method to assure a wider 
public participation in the future would be to conduct the decision analysis on 
the Internet.
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6 Conclusions
In the discussion we already pointed out that these kind of facilitated workshops 
are of real value. The main benefits include an improved understanding of 
the real risks, policy alternatives and stakeholders’ perceptions that are 
likely to emerge in a large nuclear accident. Our current group of participants 
represented the high level of both the governmental and the local authorities 
and stakeholders. Workshops like this help to create a shared vision of the 
risks, realistic countermeasure policies and preparedness needs. Our workshop 
confirmed the earlier conclusions about the general usefulness and feasibility 
of the approach but also some new observations were made.
There should be a general discussion about the ranges of the effects of 
radiation risks in general and a comparison of accident consequences with other 
risks. This was done in our workshop with a summarizing page “How much is 
much” and a short presentation followed by a discussion. For example, in that 
very area of Finland, radon gas generated in the rock of the ground finds its 
way into houses and causes significant health risks comparable with the risks 
caused by the major nuclear accident of this scenario.
One interesting observation was that acceptability or feasibility issues 
related to extensive measures did not turn out to be critical in Finland. It was 
not these direct problems that mattered but the indirect concerns included in 
the attributes of anxiety and credibility. This is a phenomenon which is likely to 
reflect the culture of governance in various countries.
Another conclusion is that the participants easily learn to use the Web-
HIPRE decision analysis software. It was clearly noticed that the personal 
interactive analysis of individual trade-offs helped to strengthen the participants’ 
views on the importance of factors in the case. Also the resulting priority 
weights created a means to communicate about the strategies which were 
found feasible.
The final conclusion is that such workshops should be part of the 
permanent safety practices of the authorities as they provide a way to learn the 
communication of needs and to get a comprehensive overall view of potential 
problems in major accidents.
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